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A Transpational Corporation is an institution not a sentient being.
I
However, institutions do have requirements (contextual and internal) for 
survival, expansion, attainment of objectives. These objectives and 
requirements do inform the operating styles, selection of data and of 
choices to consider at institutional level and create the context in 
which the human beings who are TNC executives think and act. Therefore, 
it is not - at least not necessarily - a confusion in terms to speak 
of TNC rationality.
That rationality turns on three requirements:
a. security and survival
b. growth and expansion
c. surplus generation (profit) and accumulation (investment)
It is naive to speak of maximising any one of thse goals - even if economists, 
supporters and critics often do so. Each is integral - if survival is not 
achieved there can be no growth and accumulation; if growth is lost both 
surplus generation and security are at risk; if surplus and accumulation 
lag, growth cannot be financed and survival is threatened either by bank­
ruptcy or takeover.
The goals are usually broadly complementary. However, they are not - 
especially in specific cases - totally so. Certain means of holding wages 
down may maximise profits now at the expense of the productivity, docility 
or even presence of the labour force in the future. Absolute avoidance 
of taxes is likely to imperil survival whether because the state reacts or 
collapses.
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This logic is the logic of "high" capitalism (and probably of pre-communist 
socialist productive units in a socialist state constructed directly from 
Das Kapital). It is not necessarily the logic of medium and small capitalism 
in that for such enterprises survival, avoiding negative growth and some 
satisfactory level of profits may be perceived as adequate logical goals.
The TNC, however, has an additional element in its rationality. It operates 
on a geographic spread not confined by national frontiers. This is not true 
of small, medium or even some high capitalist (and socialist) enterprises 
which are basically nationally bounded. Nor is it the same as economic 
models which take the world as a single production unit because these 
either abstract totally from the state or implicitly assume a single 
global state. The TNC operates across national boundaries but in a 
context of bounded, nation states.
A corollary of the logic of survival, expansion and accumulation on a global 
(theoretically and potentially) or multi-country (operationally) basis is 
large size. This may be - indeed, usually is - absolute but the requirement 
is really of large size relative to the total production and/or marketing 
of the goods and/or services in which that TNC specialises.
Ancestry of the TNC
The TNC is not a mutant without identifiable ancestors nor one with a 
totally new logic. It is perhaps going too far to claim the bankers (money 
changers) and commodity brokers (sellers of doves) whom Christ drove from 
the Temple as ancestors but the Jewish and Greek banking/merchant 
communities of the Middle East - Mahgreb - Rome of that period did exhibit 
a number of characteristics which could be termed proto-TNC.
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The rise of high capitalism with the waning of the middle ages five
centuries ago gives a clearer and more subsequently sequential set of
ancestors, eg:
a. the long distance traders of Venice (including its best known
Merchant);
b. The House of Fugger who financed governments by the dozen and
organised a European Copper Price Stabilisation Scheme (and ended 
insolvent);
c. the state financed, research and development (on navigation and
shipbuilding) establishment of Prince Henry the Navigator which 
opened the way for the Iberian outsurge culminating in the 19th 
century global colonial world that Europe made;
d. the great chartered companies (Adam Smith's prime targets as enemies
of the public good) such as the East India Companies - Clive of 
India is surely the prototype in style and character to men like 
Geneen and Rowland (a judgement perhaps a shade too harsh on Colonel 
Clive);
e. the 19th Century banking (eg Rothschild's, Barclays), merchanting
(eg United Africa, Compagnie Francaise d'Afrique Occidentale,
Danish East Asiatic)( mining (eg Consolidated Gold Fields, the 
ancestors of Shell and Exxon, the Rhodes group), transport (eg
P and 0, Suez Canal) and conglomerate (eg Societe Generale de 
Belgique) companies whose reach was at least imperial;
f. the "merchants of death" (not excluding the clear survivors and
descendants such as Du Pont, ICI, Nobel, Krupp, Societe Generale) 
so widely denounced in the years 1910-1950 as the financiers, 
provisioners and entrepreneurial instigators of war (again perhaps 
a trifle unfair - high tension, high sale and limited actual war 
probably was their standard optimum).
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The list could be extended but the examples are adequate to make the point - 
high capitalism has always had a logic and trend otward global reach.
Further, state-enterprise interaction including state ownership/finance is 
nothing new and is a critical role for research and development, communications 
and finance. The variety of forms may suggest something else - the logic of 
high capitalism requires change over time as contexts (including states, 
knowledge and technology, levels of productive forces, class and social 
formation consciousness) change - otherwise security, growth and accumulation 
will be constrained, put at risk or lost. Those who developed from the 
slave or East India trades through "legitimate" trade to global banking 
survived (consider Barclays), those who stuck rigidly to one approach and 
model joined the mastadons and the great medieval abbey communities in 
extinction (consider the various East India Companies).
Nothing New Under the Sun?
However, there are significant differences between TNC's of the last quarter 
of the 20th Century (whether private capitalist, state owned capitalist, 
or socialist state owned),and their predecessors. The House of Fugger 
is an ancestor of both RTZ and Barclays and (much more directly) the Rhodes 
Group of Anglo American while half of Shell-Royal Dutch once was Shell 
Transport and Trading (specialising for a time in Borneo sea shells) but 
there is change as well as continuity, radical alteration of form as well 
as persistence of goals and logic.
At least eight areas of difference which appear to be of some significance 
can be identified.
First, TNC's now operate more widely. Partly this results from there being more 
significant sources and markets to be in, partly from better communication 
and partly from the break-up of empires which favours globalism and inter
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TNC Competition over segmented peripheral spheres of influence.
Second, key decision taking and review of operations is becoming more 
centralised. This is probably largely related to communications improve­
ment - Clive "acquired" Bengal before the Courts of the East India Company 
knew what was happening because if he had waited for instructions (9-14 months) 
it would have been inevitably "lost". With instant transfer of information 
and computer processing of alternatives, decentralisation enforced by time 
lags and distance is no longer very relevant.
Third, There is a more organised hierarchy from routine procurement - sale - 
production, through key production - procurement - transport - role, to 
control research/development - group planning - surplus centralisation and 
reallocation. This is partly made possible by better communication and 
partly rendered necessary by the increased role of proprietary knowledge 
creation and use.
Fourth, there is, thus, more specialisation and division of labour among 
subsidiaries and branches. The same may (usually does) apply to work within 
branches. Any particular occupation tends to become divided and routinized 
(moving down the hierarchy) but the constant creation of new technical and 
professorial specialists centering at upper and middle levels results in a 
certain overall stability in "skilling" for theTNCs as a group and shifts 
up and down for individual units and given periods.
Fifth, a greater number of economic activities have came to be TNC ("high" 
capitalist) dominated ie the family, the local and the national firm 
have tended to became less independent and more subordinated over a 
broader number of sectors.
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Sixth, that trend relates to the systematic entry of TNC's into manufacturing.
The old proto-TNC areas were commerce, transport and finance plus capital 
intensive raw material production (mining and - to a lesser degree - 
plantations). Only in the 20th Century has production come to be generally 
dominated by "high" capitalism and only since the 1950's to be primarily 
organised by TNC's. (There were precedents but often - eg chemicals and 
gunpowder - more in the form of cartels among national enterprises - say 
du Pont and I.E.Farben - than institutional interpenetration of markets via 
true TNC's.
Seventh, knowledge - more specifically proprietary knowledge from whose use 
profit can be derived and general access to which can be prevented (whether 
by patents or - more usually - by commercial secrecy and the cost of independent 
reproduction) - has become the central factor of surplus production for at least 
the most dynamic TNC's and therefore research - development - data processing
- communication have become central areas of activity not just for TNC's 
specialising in them but for almost all TNC. (Weakness in these areas is a 
hallmark of moribound TNC's. Some plantation and mining groups eg United 
Fruit and Anaconda Copper have exhibited it very markedly and - as a direct 
result - have not survived as independent entities).
Eighth, the size of TNC's absolutely, relative to non-TNC competitors and
- for the largest - relative to states has risen. This can be overdrawn, 
the East India Company was not small relative to HMG but Du Pont-Conoco is 
larger and there are more Du Pont-Conoco's than there were "Honourable Companies".
TNCs and States: Conflict, Cooperation and Complicity
To see state/TNC relationships in terms of permanant unresolved conflict, 
of total mutual interest or of unilateral domination (either way) is to
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oversimplify to the point of gross distortion. Relations are complex, 
problematic and fluid even in one context at one point of time and much 
more so across time and space.
TNC relations with home states (those in which a key chunk of planning - 
central management - research and development is located and/or where 
ownership is concentrated) are not identical to those with host (some 
activities, perhaps large ones but not including any significant fraction 
of the top layers of the hierarchy) states. In the former the TNC needs a 
stable base from which to operate and a relation with the state that will
allow it to gain state backing on key international issues (eg GATT tariff
rounds, Multi-Fibre Arrangements, Commodity Agreements, Codes of Conduct, 
"permanent soverignty over natural resources") and conflicts (eg legislation 
or policies of host states).
Therefore - quite apart from the fact that the human beings who run TNCs do 
have national loyalties they do not totally shuck off in their corporate roles 
- TNCs in a meaningful sense do have home or base countries. This is not
to say they have policies totally congruent with the foreign policies of
their bosses or vice-versa. That incidentally is in itself problematic 
from a host point of view - that several US TNC's (oil,mining, banking, 
aviation) perceive Angola as a sound, profitable partner and vehemently 
object to US destablisation policy is as much a product of such divergences 
as was ITT's "self help" destablisation" campaign in Chile^both prior to and 
less "subtle than the official one.
Host state relations turn on gaining access (generalised free trade defined 
as the right of the economically strong to enter without let or hindrance 
into the territory of the economically weak), on avoiding costs and on 
securing benefits (eg stock capital such as rail and port facilities,
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government backing vis a vis labour or peasant bodies or competitors). How 
much a TNC will "give" for access and support depends in part on how valuable 
it perceives it as being, or what alternatives both it and the state have 
and on how effective the state is at perceiving and bargaining for its (or 
its backers') interests.
States and TNCs necessarily have partially divergent interests. States are 
short and wide - they cover all of a limited geographic area TNC's are long 
and thin - they cover a limited number of activities over a broad (or unbounded) 
geographic sweep. States must take account of certain interests and activities 
of no concern to TNCs and TNCs have options not open to states (or territorially 
limited companies) which can mean de facto commitment to one state (and against 
others) in any given case.
TNCs in principle - so they assert - want freedom from state action. In 
practice they do want freedom from regulations and changes limiting growth, 
surplus generation, accumulation and shifting resources among states. (They 
are by no means so concerned that these benefits be passed to other TNCs - 
Lenin's comment that the next to last capitalist could be hanged with rope 
sold for the purpose by the last captures one element of intra-TNC relations 
even if not the whole of them). However, they want a whole series of positive 
interference from protective tariffs to tax waivers and from cheap services 
to support for export promotion costs. Self-reliance as a TNC principle is 
seen as perfectly compatible with negotiating state contributions to surplus 
so long as the TNC is the dominant party in the negotiations.
In addition, there is a further, more general point. If states did not 
exist TNCs would have to create them. Provision of basic infrastructure (stock 
capital), handling labour force production - maintenance - training (health, 
education, water), physical security (police, army), macro economic management, 
(eg ensuring demand to buy goods and/or an overall economic context other
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"Withering Away of the State"?
TNC advocates used to assert with great conviction that the nation state was 
obsolete and that only TNCs could achieve the necessary efficiency in 
production at global level. (Today they are less confident - first, in some 
cases TNCs do perceive themselves, not states, as at bay and second, few 
TNCs want to take over the very real macro economic problems now confronting 
virtually all states). TNC opponents often assert that states are powerless 
in the face of or mere tools in the hands of TNCs. (Operationally an unwise 
general stand unless one is world federalist and sees a global state as the 
answer or an anarchist as it implies that no state can do anything, and 
therefore provides states and elites with a perfect excuse for all failings 
in that respect).
Both postions are very considerable over-statements which capture the 
reality of TNC power and of inherent conflict between broad territorially 
bounded and narrow globally mobile institutions at the expense of failing to 
see the limits on TNCs and the complexity of state-TNC relationships.
The ability of TNCs to avoid taxs and regulations is not unlimited unless 
a state believes it to be so and acts on that belief (as the UK sometimes 
seems to do) or unless other states are engaged in cut-throat bidding for 
the same TNCs (contrast pre-1965 and post-1973 host country/foreign oil 
company relationships and how this shift changed the degrees of freedom 
open to a previously isolated national oil company like that of Mexico).
Nor do TNCs prefer head on conflicts to compromises. The former carry 
survival risks, dislocation of profits, halts to growth, dangers of 
escalation in the immediate case and emulation elsewhere. True, if 
a TNC misjudges a situation and has a "bluff" called it may decide to fight 
a l'outrance to encourage other states not to behave like its opponent 
but that is a second best choice resulting from initial miscalulation or
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the mark of a stodgy TNC (eg many of the hard rock mining and plantation 
companies).
Major TNC initiatives require state backing for security, for access to 
capital and markets, for reasonable certainty as to profit flows. Eg the 
Rossing Uranium project in occupied Namibia is a joint violation of 
international law by the Republic of South Africa, the UK and RTZ not 
the unilateral creation of the latter.
True, TNCs have a bargaining card in their ability to go elsewhere. But 
there is no inherent reason states cannot agree on minimum terms, conditions, 
regulations which are coordinated among them to limit such TNC freedom 
of maneuvre. Some limits of this type do exist and operate in EEC, as 
in OPEC - it could be made a growth area.
Further, TNCs - as suggested earlier - have neither the desire nor the 
capacity for macro management nationally or globally, on employment or 
market buying power or security. Because they need states to handle these 
issues for them (from a TNC perspective just as a state, per contra, 
might see TNCs as necessary to handle large scale production or exports 
or knowledge flows for it), TNCs are and know they are constrained to 
make some payments to and accept some regulations from states - if the 
states insist. It is no accident that the European iron and steel 
(existing) and chemical (on the drawing board) cartels are organised 
by EEC and sub-managed by its nation states - the TNCs could not agree 
among themselves and could not control the middle and national capitalist 
"interlopers" without state backing. One may suspect that EEC and the 
states have not demanded adequate "compensation for services rendered" 
but that is a different question - one of recurent myopia rather than 
the generic senility of states.
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TNC's. Hierarchy, Labour and Poor People
TNCs are hierarchical. Hierarchy's deal most easily with predictable, 
relatively similar, relatively stable, relatively efficient hierarchies. 
Unpredictability, spontaneity, absence of decision takers able to make 
binding commitments, radically different styles of behaviour and disorder 
turn them off.
The implications are not so stable as they may seem. A Pinochet style 
regime (in the absence of more resistance than at present) meets these 
tests but so do Ireland, Yugoslavia and Tanzania. A democratic structure, 
civil rights and pre-negotiation participation do not disqualify a 
country if an orderly negotiation, leading to a decision that will be 
implemented, in a context of stability with good prospects of substantial 
surplus (or avoidance of substantial additional loss in a renegotiation 
case) is attainable. On the other hand TNCs as such put no great faith 
in the value of democracy, civil rights, development or participation 
as such or even as means to increasing stability or broadening markets. 
Certainly they did not see Bokassa's Central African Empire, Macias'
Nguema's Equatorial Guinea, any of the last three governments in 
Afghanistan or Iddi Amin Dada's Uganda as plausible choices for significant 
activity but lact of predictability, stability and surplus prospects not 
the nature of the regimes from a human point of view was the reason.
TNCs prefer to deal from a position of strength. Eg for a decade OPEC 
wanted to negotiate as a unit but the oil companies (wisely in the very 
short run) declined because they prefered to play off states and to handle 
overall output management - thus the eventual unilateralism of OPEC in 1973. 
Thus internationally they prefer to deal with states and unions separately 
and nationally to negotiate separately withandplay off various government 
units and economic or social groups - unless this leads to delays and
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confusions from their own point of view.
For labour TNC's pose two specific institutional problems. First, TNCs, 
but not by and large unions, can operate on a global basis so that each 
union in one piece of a TNC ends negotiating with the whole TNC with the 
other pieces' unions de facto waved at it as potential (no matter how 
unintentional) strikebreakers. Second, TNCs are larger and better organised 
than other employers and, therefore, more able to bear the costs of 
industrial action (or more accurately industrial inaction).
Beyond this it is hard to generalise. On average TNC terms and conditions 
of employment are above national averages. This partly relates to TNCs 
choice of relatively high productivity, high growth, high surplus activities 
- they can afford to pay more and need to have the pick of the labour 
market. In part it relates to a higher proportion of TNCs than of small, 
middle or national capitalists seeing better than average wages and 
conditions of employment as either directly paying off in productivity, 
insurance against risks of disruption and/or an investment in acquiring at 
least passive legitimacy and acceptance. (Certainly there are TNCs which 
pay starvation wages, decline to negotiate with workers, etc - but these 
are not characteristics unique to TNCs and are probably less common among 
them than among employers in general).
To the TNC the poor are normally invisible - they are excluded from its 
concerns because very few of them are its direct customers, employees 
or sources of supply. Unless a clear route to growth and profit can be 
seen by relating to the poor (or a clear threat to survival from not doing 
so) a TNC will normally ignore them. This is exclusion and facilitates 
their oppresion and exploitation by others (quite possibly in ways 
benefitting the TNC) but it is rarely the result of any direct TNC concern 
with exploiting the poor as such. If as a result of an external event
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the poor become less poor, or more skilled or able to supply a key good, 
then the TNC will become interested in selling to, buying from or hiring 
them.
However, the nature of the TNC product and knowledge mixes do create biases 
against the poor. TNCs by and large produce goods and services designed 
for specialised and mass markets in high income countries. They create 
and apply knowledge in relation to those goods and services.
This approach does exclude the poor (in the centre as well as on the 
periphery). If most people in a state are poor and TNCs or national copies 
of TNCs dominate economic activity the poor will be excluded as customers 
and employees. Major alterations of production, products and technology 
to achieve different outputs and scales for small poor countries is 
unlikely to pay for a TNC. Similarly developing new small scale, simple 
knowledge is rarely profitable - the users cannot pay much, the proprietary 
control needed for high "rents" is inconsistent with broad use, direct 
operation by the TNC would not be viable.
Again the poor are likely to be shoved aside or ignored not absorbed or 
incorporated as suppliers or employees or customers. They cannot generally 
contribute as objects to growth or surplus and pose a threat as subjects 
to survival and are, therefore, perceived by most TNCs as irrelevant to 
their logic (living in a different parallel world).
Quo Vadis?
Eliminating TNCs is neither a necessary, a sufficient nor a practicable 
first step:
a. TNCs are central to large scale economic activity and knowledge
development - if they are to be abolished something must be put in 
their place;
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b. many of the less human and less desirable features of TNC structure
and logic are inherent in large scale economic activity - simply
nationalizing them does little (sometimes does nothing) by itself to 
deal with these;
c. TNC's respond to contexts - if a state or a church or an organisation 
of the poor can make specific changes profitable (or loss avoiding) 
the TNC's own logic will cause them to change;
d. the duty of acting in the interests of the poor lies with organisations
of the poor and of all people (eg states, churches, parties) not with 
specialised economic units which have neither legitimacy in, nor capacity 
for, setting socio-economic and political economic goods. But it does 
not follow that such bodies are the best choices to carry out all
forms of economic activity.
On the other hand attempts to "convert" TNCs face three insurmountable
barriers:
a. TNCs are implausible as social consciences, defenders of the poor, 
human value setters - their capacity and legitimacy for independent 
action in these areas is nil and such action (except in response to a 
context enforcing it or making it pay) contradicts their inherent 
logic;
b. macro economic management and human development are logically state 
concerns nationally and interstate globally - not functions to be 
hived off to TNCs (or to non-responsible bodies of Platonic guardians 
neither selected by nor responsible to members of the public);
c. TNCs are not human beings and therefore do not have (cannot have) 
moral values in the gospel sense. (Whether states can is a highly 
controversial question but at least in some contexts and to some 
degree an affirmative answer seems possible).
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Efficiency in production, surplus generation and accumulation is not the 
sum total of development nor of the wealth of nations and peoples. But - 
especially in conditions of low average productive forces per person-it is 
usually a necessary component. If development is justified in terms of
the human condition then more food, more education, more pure water, more
shelter, more access to communications (of self, of goods, of knowledge), 
more health services, more clothing are necessary especially for poor 
people in poor states. Wasting resources in such a context is a sin 
whether the waste is on ostentatious luxury for the few or incompetence 
which prevents production or causes it to go lost, strayed, stolen or 
spoilt. There is a role for large units in a significant number of aspects 
of economic life including international economic relations. TNC logic - 
if constrained by social and political requirements, penalties or 
inducements - can on occasion be efficient in creating and operating such 
units.
However, if that route is to be taken several requirements arise if it is 
to be reasonably consistent with the basic human needs of the poor and of 
labour more generally:
a. the state must systematically frame policies relative to large
economic units (public and private, foreign and domestic) which
include regulations, penalties and incentives which cause specific 
aspects of social, political, economic and human goals to "pay" for 
TNCs (eg a shut down for certain levels of air pollution, a graduated 
penalty charge for those down to a norm and premia for still lower 
levels makes cleaning up the air serve survival and surplus generation);
b. where TNC regulations require global (or at least transnational) 
action, states (and union and churches) must act together trans- 
nationally at least to the extent of agreeing on minimum
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national actions and recognition of national legal decision relating 
to such actions by the courts of other states;
c. reducing unilateral external dependence by building national capacity 
(public and private, production of goods and production of knowledge) 
and by substitution of interdependence (eg South-South multinational 
enterprises by groups of South states, more TNCs or quasi-TNCs based 
in smaller and poorer countries);
d. facilitating small and medium scale production - especially when it 
directly benefits and can be controlled by the poor - wherever reason­
ably efficient in resouce use and providing services, subsidies and 
stock capital to such production more generously than to TNCs (the 
exact inverse of the normal present situation);
e. identifying goods and techniques which in a given context at a given 
time have unavoidable negative spinoffs which justify their restriction 
or barring (eg for a majority of the world's countries, private 
saloon cars, baby foods, factory fishing of inshore waters) followed
by action to ban or restrict so long as the negative macro consequences 
remain significant;
f. ensuring that self-organisation by the poor is allowed, supported 
when its members desire it (not "guided" or smother loved), listened 
to and worked with by states, organised labour, churches, where 
appropriate, TNCs.
It may be argued that most states (or unions or churches) have little 
interest in such proposals. To the extent that is true then they must be 
transformed first before any approach to TNC regulation, limitation (let 
alone removal) can be effective. TNCs may well often be powers and 
principalities in the biblical sense but they are hardly the only ones.
The logic of survival, growth and investment is a useful servant and means 
even if it is a very inadequate or noxious general goal and master. TNCs
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are basically amoral - when their amorality serves immorality (as it often 
does) it makes little sense simply to condemn their amorality without 
seeking ways and means to force or induce them to follow their own logic 
in ways with more acceptable consequences for workers and the poor.
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